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Abstract
According to the memory colour effect, the colour of a colour-diagnostic object is not perceived
independently of the object itself. Instead, it has been shown through an achromatic adjustment
method that colour-diagnostic objects still appear slightly in their typical colour, even when they
are colourimetrically grey. Bayesian models provide a promising approach to capture the effect of
prior knowledge on colour perception and to link these effects to more general effects of cue
integration. Here, we model memory colour effects using prior knowledge about typical colours as
priors for the grey adjustments in a Bayesian model. This simple model does not involve any fitting
of free parameters. The Bayesian model roughly captured the magnitude of the measured memory
colour effect for photographs of objects. To some extent, the model predicted observed
differences in memory colour effects across objects. The model could not account for the
differences in memory colour effects across different levels of realism in the object images. The
Bayesian model provides a particularly simple account of memory colour effects, capturing some
of the multiple sources of variation of these effects.
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Introduction
How does memory inﬂuence perception? The memory colour eﬀect shows that knowledge
about the typical colour of an object aﬀects how we perceive the actual colour of that object
Corresponding author:
Christoph Witzel, Justus Liebig Universitat Giessen, Otto-Behaghel-Str. 10F 35394 Giessen, Germany.
Email: cwitzel@daad-alumni.de
Creative Commons CC BY: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License
(http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without
further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sage-
pub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).
i-Perception
2018 Vol. 9(3), 1–16
! The Author(s) 2018
DOI: 10.1177/2041669518771715
journals.sagepub.com/home/ipe
(Olkkonen, Hansen, & Gegenfurtner, 2012; Witzel & Gegenfurtner, 2014; Witzel & Hansen,
2015). For example, a banana is perceived as slightly yellow even when it is colourimetrically
grey (Hansen, Olkkonen, Walter, & Gegenfurtner, 2006).
Such memory colour eﬀects have been shown in an achromatic adjustment task, where
observers are asked to adjust images of objects so that the objects look grey to them. In this
task, observers perceive objects as slightly tinted in their typical colour when they are
colourimetrically grey. As a consequence, they adjust the objects approximately to the
opponent colour in order to compensate for the typical colour. For example, bananas are
adjusted slightly towards the blue direction in order to perceive them as grey. This has been
shown for diﬀerent objects with diﬀerent typical colours (Hansen et al., 2006; Kimura et al.,
2013; Olkkonen, Hansen, & Gegenfurtner, 2008; Witzel, Valkova, Hansen, & Gegenfurtner,
2011). Observers also tend to choose a bluish banana over a colourimetrically grey banana
when they are asked to choose the one that looks most grey (Witzel, 2016).
A recent article contested the idea of top-down inﬂuences on perception and suggested
that memory colour eﬀects might not involve visual perception at all (Firestone & Scholl,
2016). According to Firestone and Scholl (2016), perception can be clearly separated from
cognition, and there is no role for cognitive factors such as prior knowledge and memory in
perceptual processing. This is shown, they argue, by the fact that common models in vision
science do not involve such cognitive factors (Firestone & Scholl, 2016, pp. 1–2).
However, theoretically, a simple Bayesian model might well incorporate memory colour
eﬀects (Witzel, Olkkonen, & Gegenfurtner, 2016). According to the memory colour eﬀect, the
perception of colour-diagnostic objects is a combination of the sensory signal of perceived
greyness and the expectation based on memory colours. This idea is captured by a simple
Bayesian model that integrates the sensory signal of perceived greyness and the prior about
memory colours to predict the empirically measured memory colour eﬀects.
Bayesian models have been used successfully to capture the eﬀects of prior knowledge on
perception, for instance in colour constancy (Brainard et al., 2006), orientation perception
(Girshick, Landy, & Simoncelli, 2011) and temporal interval estimation (Jazayeri & Shadlen,
2010), as well as perceptual cue integration (Ernst & Banks, 2002). A recent study also
modelled eﬀects of linguistic colour categories on short-term colour memory (Cibelli, Xu,
Austerweil, Griﬃths, & Regier, 2016).
Applying the Bayesian framework on the memory colour eﬀect, the observer’s perceptual
estimate is calculated by combining the noisy sensory signal inherent in the perception of grey
colour with knowledge about the typical colour of an object, the prior. According to Bayes’
rule, the ﬁnal perceptual estimate (the posterior) depends on the reliabilities of the sensory
signal and of the prior, with more shift or bias towards the prior when uncertainty in the
sensory signal increases (Knill & Richards, 1996; Maloney & Mamassian, 2009).
Such a Bayesian model is particularly simple: It only requires two measured variables
(prior and sensory signal) to predict the dependent variable (memory colour eﬀects).
Hence, it is completely determined by empirical data and does not require any ﬁtting of
parameters. A Bayesian model of memory colour eﬀects links these eﬀects to more general
cue-integration eﬀects where diﬀerent sources of information are combined (Witzel &
Gegenfurtner, in press). This would create a comprehensive framework for understanding
these kinds of eﬀects.
A Bayesian model seems particularly promising for at least two reasons. First, Witzel et al.
(2011) observed a correlation between memory colour eﬀects and colour diagnosticity for the
stimuli of the ﬁrst experiment of Olkkonen et al. (2008). Colour diagnosticity was measured
through response times in a two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) task, in which observers
had to report the typical colour of greyscale objects by keypress. Per deﬁnition, colour
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diagnosticity is based on knowledge about the typical colour (Witzel & Gegenfurtner, 2014;
Witzel & Hansen, 2015). Consequently, our deﬁnition of the prior is conceptually related to
the response time measure of colour diagnosticity; although the prior used here is determined
diﬀerently from that measure of colour diagnosticity (mean and reliability of typical
adjustments instead of response times in a diﬀerent task). At the same time, the response
time measure of colour diagnosticity explained only a relatively small part of the variance
(about 27%), and it only occurred for the stimuli of Olkkonen et al. (2008) but not for those
of Witzel et al. (2011). These limitations suggested that factors or models other than simple
regressions might provide a better account of memory colour eﬀects (cf. discussion in Witzel
et al., 2011).
Second, one other factor might be the uncertainty of the sensory signal, that is, the grey
adjustments. According to previous observations, memory colour eﬀects are related to the
uncertainty of grey perception along the blue–yellow direction of the daylight locus (Witzel &
Hansen, 2015; Witzel et al., 2011). The daylight locus is a curve in colour space along which
natural daylight varies (Granzier & Valsecchi, 2014; Judd et al., 1964; Mollon, 2006; Taylor
& Kerr, 1941). Variation of grey adjustments is largest on the daylight locus, indicating that
observers are uncertain about colour appearance along this colour direction (Bosten, Beer, &
MacLeod, 2015; Chauhan et al., 2014; Witzel, Racey, & O’Regan, 2017; Witzel et al., 2011;
Wuerger, Hurlbert, & Witzel, 2015). At the same time, memory colour eﬀects were larger for
objects whose typical colours are closer to the daylight locus (Witzel & Hansen, 2015; Witzel
et al., 2011). The Bayesian model would explain why the uncertainty of grey settings along
the daylight locus modulates the magnitude of memory colour eﬀects: The higher the
uncertainty of the signal (grey settings), the higher the inﬂuence of the prior (memory
colours).
In this study, we empirically tested the idea that a standard Bayesian model may predict
the magnitude of memory colour eﬀects. The strength of associations between objects and
their typical colours depends on the observers’ knowledge and the objects themselves (Witzel
et al., 2011). Hence, diﬀerent observers and diﬀerent objects imply diﬀerent priors. If the
Bayesian approach applies in the case of memory colour, a Bayesian model should predict
variation in the magnitude of the memory colour eﬀects across diﬀerent objects and
observers. We tested these predictions with the data from the studies of Hansen et al.
(2006), Olkkonen et al. (2008), and Witzel et al. (2011).
General Method
Stimuli
All images of objects were presented on a grey background. The luminance of the images was
adjusted to be on average isoluminant with the background. Colours were represented in the
Derrington–Krauskopf–Lennie colour space (Derrington, Krauskopf, & Lennie, 1984;
Krauskopf, Williams, & Heeley, 1982), for which the origin corresponded to the grey of
the background.
Procedure
In all experiments, three types of empirical measurements were obtained:
(1) Typical adjustments of colour-diagnostic objects: Observers adjusted the colour of the
image of the object so that it had the typical colour of the object, as remembered by
the observer. The knowledge about the typical colour deﬁnes the expected colour of the
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object. The average and the standard deviation of these adjustments were used to model
the prior (blue curve in Figure 1). In other words, the precision of the colour in the
observer’s memory deﬁnes the strength of the expected colour of a particular object.
(2) Achromatic adjustments of a disk: Observers adjusted the colour of a colour-neutral disk
so that it looked grey to them. The disk does not have a memory colour, and hence its
adjustment only varies because of noise in the perception of grey (Plus some motor noise,
which we disregarded here). The average and the standard deviation of these adjustments
were used to model the sensory signal (grey curve in Figure 1). In other words, the
standard deviation deﬁned the certainty of the sensory signal when perceiving a grey
colour.
(3) Grey adjustments of colour-diagnostic objects: Observers adjusted the colour of the image
of colour-diagnostic objects so that they looked grey to them. Our aim is to predict the
average of these measures (dotted vertical line in Figure 1) through the average of the
posterior calculated based on prior and sensory signal in the Bayesian model (red curve in
Figure 1).
To adjust the colours, observers could press four keys to add red, yellow, green and blue.
Adjustments were translated into polar coordinates, resulting in a hue shift and a rescaling of
saturation of the colour distribution. Measures of colour adjustments report the coordinates
of the most saturated colour of the colour distribution. Details on the achromatic adjustment
procedure may be found in our previous publications (Hansen et al., 2006; Olkkonen et al.,
2008; Witzel & Hansen, 2015; Witzel et al., 2011, 2016).
Figure 1. Illustration of the Bayesian model of the memory colour effect. The model predictions and data
shown here are based on the aggregated data (cf. ‘third approach to test the models’) taken from Hansen
et al. (2006). (a and b) Illustration of a model for the data of the banana and the orange, respectively. The
x-axis corresponds to the adjustments projected onto the hue direction of the typical colour of the
respective object. In the case of the banana (a) the adjustments vary along a blue–yellow dimension, in the
case of the orange along a turquoise-orange dimension. The y-axis shows the probability density of
adjustments along a respective hue direction (x-axis). The thin grey and the blue curves show normal
distributions fitted to the empirical adjustments of the grey disk (sensory signal) and of the typical colour of
the object (prior knowledge), respectively. The vertical dotted line corresponds to the average memory
colour effect resulting from the grey adjustments of the objects. The thick red curve shows the memory
effect predicted by the Bayesian model. The proximity between the peak of the red curve and the dotted
black line indicates how well the model predicted the empirically measured effect.
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Bayesian Model
Memory colour eﬀects are quantiﬁed along the chromatic dimension of the memory colour,
for example, along the blue–yellow dimension of the typical yellow of the banana (Hansen
et al., 2006; Olkkonen et al., 2008; Witzel & Hansen, 2015; Witzel et al., 2011, 2016).
Accordingly, we assessed uncertainty along the chromatic dimension of the memory
colour. Typical and grey adjustments were projected onto that dimension, and averages
and standard deviations were calculated for the projected coordinates. Projected
coordinates of grey adjustments provided the uncertainty of the signal, those for the
typical adjustments the uncertainty of the prior.
The average (M) of the predicted memory colour eﬀects (posterior, red curve in Figure 1)
was calculated based on the weighted average of sensory signal (grey curve in Figure 1) and
the prior (blue curve in Figure 1), where the weights correspond to their relative reliability
(Ernst, 2006; Ernst & Banks, 2002). The weighted average is calculated as follows:
M ¼ w1 Pþ w2 S
where P is the average of the prior and S is the average of the signal; w1 and w2 are the
weights, which are calculated as follows:
w1 ¼ r1
r1þ r2
where r1 and r2 are the reliabilities of the prior and the signal, respectively. Reliabilities were
calculated as (Backus & Banks, 1999):
r ¼ 1
var
Finally, the standard deviation of the posterior (SD) was calculated as follows:
SD ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
r1þ r2ð Þ
s
We tested the relationship between measured memory colour eﬀects and the predictions
from a Bayesian model in three ways. First, we computed the Bayesian model for each
individual observer. In all experiments, each observer completed three to ﬁve repeated
measurements of grey adjustments and typical adjustments (e.g., the memorized yellow of
the banana). Observers also made grey adjustments with disks, which are colour-neural. The
variance across repeated measurements of the disk’s grey adjustments was used to calculate
the reliability of the signal. Similarly, the variance for the memory colour adjustments for
each object was used to calculate the reliabilities of the respective priors.
In the ﬁrst approach to test the model, we correlated the predicted memory colour eﬀect
with the measured memory colour eﬀect for each individual separately. Then we Fisher
transformed the individual correlation coeﬃcients and tested with a t test across
individuals whether the correlation was positive.
In the second approach to test the model, we pooled all the data across all individuals and
all stimuli in one dataset. Then, we calculated a correlation between the predicted and
measured eﬀects. In this approach, the variation across individual observers is also part of
the variation in this dataset. This approach also provides a particularly high statistical power.
Finally, the third approach was based on the aggregated data. The calculation of the
Bayesian model requires specifying variances, but the variance of average data diﬀers from
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the variance of individual data (cf. the diﬀerence between standard deviation and standard
error). The averages of each observer are normally distributed and the variance of those
averages corresponds to the variance across repeated measurements divided by the number of
repeated measurements (var/n). Hence, we used the variance of averages to calculate the
reliability of signals and priors for the aggregate data.
Study of Hansen et al. (2006)
Method
Fourteen observers participated in the experiment of Hansen et al. (2006). The colour
diagnostic objects were seven fruits and vegetables: a banana, lemon, carrot, orange,
lettuce, grapes and courgette. In all experiments, there were two kinds of disks, one with
uniform colour and one with a luminance noise texture; adjustments of these disks are pooled
and presented as one measurement. Observers completed ﬁve typical and ﬁve grey
adjustments for each colour-diagnostic object and ﬁve grey adjustments of the colour-
neutral disk.
Results and Discussion
Figure 1 illustrates the predictions of the model using the aggregated data for the banana and
orange. In general, the model predictions (shown with the red curves) were similar in
magnitude to the measured eﬀects (vertical dotted lines), although the model sometimes
underestimated the magnitude of the eﬀect. This is illustrated by Figure 2(a), which shows
predicted (red bars) and measured (grey bars) memory colour eﬀects side by side. Measured
memory colour eﬀects were signiﬁcantly larger than the ones predicted by the Bayesian
model, pred-meas¼ 0.03, t(6)¼ 4.7, p¼ .003. However, predicted eﬀects were positively
Figure 2. Predictions for aggregated data of Hansen et al. (2006). (a) Measured (grey) and predicted (red)
memory colour effects. The x-axis lists the seven objects and the y-axis represents the shifts along the hue
direction of the typical colour. Error bars correspond to standard errors of mean, across individual
measurements and based on the standard deviation of the model, respectively. (b) Correlation between
predicted (x-axis) and measured (y-axis) memory colour effects. The correlation is reported in the upper left
corner. *p< .05 in a one-tailed t test.
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correlated with the measured ones in a one-tailed t test, r(5)¼ .72, p¼ .03 (Figure 2(b)). This
correlation supports the idea that our Bayesian model explains the variation of memory
colour eﬀects across stimuli.
Study of Olkkonen et al. (2008)
The study of Olkkonen et al. (2008) reports two experiments. The data from the ﬁrst
experiment provide an interesting test case. That experiment used images with diﬀerent
levels of perceptual features and recognizability. We could show that the magnitude of the
memory colour eﬀect decreased with image information and recognizability (Figure 4 in
Olkkonen et al., 2008; Figure 1 in Witzel et al., 2011). However, our Bayesian model is
only designed to model the inﬂuence of knowledge about typical colours but does not
model image information and recognizability. If the observed relationship between
predicted and measured memory colours is speciﬁc to knowledge about typical colours,
the model should fail to predict the variation of the eﬀect across diﬀerent levels of
perceptual features and recognizability. At the same time, the model should predict the
variation of memory colour eﬀects across objects within a given level of perceptual
features and recognizability.
The second of the two experiments measured memory colour eﬀects under changing
illuminations. The data in that experiment showed higher variation, which is probably due
to variation in colour constancy across colours and objects. We did not consider modelling
the data from the second experiment because our Bayesian model is not appropriate for
variation of colour constancy and must fail to predict the measured eﬀects.
The ﬁrst experiment measured memory colour eﬀects under neutral illumination with
diﬀerent sets of images in two subexperiments. To simplify, we will distinguish these two
subexperiments as Experiments 1a and 1b.
Method
Experiment 1a. Fifteen observers took part in Experiment 1a. The stimulus images were
photos and outline shapes of eight fruits and vegetables. Seven of these corresponded to
the fruits and vegetables used by Hansen et al. (2006). The eighth was a photo and outline
shape of strawberry. As in Hansen et al. (2006), observers completed ﬁve repeated
measurements in Experiments 1a and 1b.
Experiment 1b. Seven observers participated in Experiment 1b. The stimulus images in
Experiment 1b featured ﬁve of the eight fruits and vegetables from Experiment 1a,
namely, banana, courgette, grapes, lemon and strawberry. Besides the photos and outline
shapes, this experiment also included photos of objects that were painted in white so that they
did not have their natural texture.
Results and Discussion
Experiment 1a. Figure 3(a) and (c) illustrates predicted and measured memory colour eﬀects
for aggregated data in Experiment 1a. For the original photographs (Figure 3(a)), predicted
memory colour eﬀects were similar in size to measured memory colour eﬀects,
pred-meas¼ 0.019, t(7)¼1.3, p¼ .24. In contrast, measured memory colour eﬀects were
signiﬁcantly smaller than predicted eﬀects for the outline shapes, pred-meas¼ 0.05, t(7)¼ 7.0,
p¼ .0002; cf. (Figure 3(c)). This reﬂects the fact that measured memory colour eﬀects were
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much smaller for outline shapes than for photographs (compare grey bars in Figure 3(c) and
Figure 3(a)), while predicted eﬀects were comparable across conditions (red bars in Figure
3(a) and (c)).
As expected, our Bayesian model cannot explain the diﬀerences between natural images
and outline shapes. The diﬀerence between the two conditions (photograph vs. outline shape)
is not a diﬀerence in certainty about memory colours but a diﬀerence of perceptual features
and recognizability of the outline shapes (Olkkonen et al., 2008; Witzel et al., 2011). The
uncertainty about the memory colour is the same for both conditions because the association
between the object and its colour in the observer’s memory does not change. Hence, predicted
memory colour eﬀects based on our Bayesian models are the same. For this reason, it is
understandable that our Bayesian models cannot explain the diﬀerence across these
conditions.
This idea is further supported by a closer look at the reliability of the adjustments
(Figure 4(a)). If the smaller memory colour eﬀects for the outline shapes were related to
the reliability of the object–colour association captured by our Bayesian model, then the
reliability of typical adjustments should be lower (i.e., variance higher) in the condition with
the outline shapes than in the condition with the photographs. The contrary was true:
Figure 3. Predictions for aggregated data of Experiment 1a of Olkkonen et al. (2008). The upper row
((a) and (b)) illustrates results for photographs, the lower row ((c) and (d)) those for the outline shapes. The
grey bars correspond to the bars in Figure 4(a) of Olkkonen et al. (2008). Note, however, that the bars in this
figure show absolute shifts of grey adjustments in the opposite direction of typical adjustments, the Memory
colour Indices shown in Olkkonen et al. (2008) represent relative shifts, that is, the absolute shifts relative to
the typical adjustments. **p< .01; p< .1.
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Variance of typical adjustments was higher for natural photographs (green bars) than for
outline shapes (blue bars), indicating that adjustments for outline shapes were more reliable
than those for photographs. Since grey adjustments are similarly reliable in both conditions,
the Bayesian model provides predictions of slightly higher memory colour eﬀects for outline
shapes than for photographs, which contradicts the diﬀerences in measured memory colour
eﬀects.
With respect to the variation across stimuli, there was a positive correlation between
predicted and measured memory colour eﬀects for outline shapes, r(6)¼ .90, p¼ .001;
Figure 3(b). The correlation coeﬃcient for the photographs was also positive, but only
marginally signiﬁcant, r(6)¼ 0.58, p¼ .07, one-tailed, Figure 3(a). Combining the data
from both conditions (natural and outline shapes) did not yield signiﬁcant results,
r(14)¼ .20, p¼ .46, one-tailed. This is understandable given that the Bayesian model
cannot account for the diﬀerence across conditions. To account for the diﬀerence between
the two conditions we calculated a ‘relative memory colour eﬀect’, which consists in the
diﬀerence between the memory colour eﬀect for each stimulus and the average memory
colour eﬀect for the condition (natural vs. outline). The predictions from the model are
positively correlated with the variation of these relative memory colour eﬀects across the
2 8 stimuli, r(14)¼ .50, p¼ .03, one-tailed.
We then tested the correlation between predicted and measured eﬀects across individual
observers (ﬁrst approach to test the model). To combine both conditions (photographs and
outline shapes), we averaged for each observer and each object Fisher-transformed
correlation coeﬃcients across conditions. We calculated the correlation between predicted
and measured eﬀects for each observer. Then we tested with a t test whether the Fisher-
transformed correlation coeﬃcients were above zero. The average resulting correlation
coeﬃcient was signiﬁcantly positive, average r¼ .16, t(14)¼ 2.0, p¼ .03, one-tailed.
Together with the result for aggregated data, these ﬁndings support the idea that the
Bayesian model predicts, to some extent, the measured memory colour eﬀects.
Figure 4. Comparison of variance in colour adjustments across conditions. (a and b) Experiments 1a and 1b
of Olkkonen et al. (2008). The different bar colours refer to the different conditions, that is, those with
photographs (green), with outline shapes (blue) and with painted fruits (green–blue). The y-axis represents
the variance of adjustments for the prior (typical adjustments) and the signal (grey adjustments) averaged
across observers and stimuli. To give an idea of variation, error bars indicate standard errors of mean across
the eight stimuli. The variances inform about the reliability of adjustments. Note that variance for typical
adjustments was higher (i.e., lower reliability) for photographs of natural and painted fruits than for uniformly
coloured outline shapes.
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However, pooling all data (across individuals and across stimuli) produced opposite
results. The correlation coeﬃcient for photographs was positive but not signiﬁcant despite
the comparatively high statistical power due to a larger number of cases, r(118)¼ .08, p¼ .20;
one-tailed; and the correlation coeﬃcient for outline shapes was even negative, r(118)¼.23.
Experiment 1b. Figure 5(a), (c) and (e) shows the results for the aggregated data of Experiment
1b. There was a tendency of the measured memory colour eﬀects to be higher than the
predicted ones for photographs, pred-meas¼0.04, t(4)¼2.8, p¼ .051, and to be lower
for outline shapes, pred-meas¼ 0.03, t(4)¼ 2.5, p¼ .07.
While these tendencies just missed signiﬁcance, they are in line with the observations for
photographs and outline shapes in Experiment 1a and support the idea that our Bayesian
model cannot account for the diﬀerences across conditions (original and painted
photographs, and outline shapes). Figure 4(b) further elucidates this observation: Variance
Figure 5. Predictions for aggregated data of Experiment 1b of Olkkonen et al. (2008). Rows illustrate
results with photographs of original objects (a and b), photographs of white-painted objects (c and d) and
outline shapes (e and f). Format is as shown in Figure 3. The grey bars correspond to the bars in Figure 4(b) of
Olkkonen et al. (2008), except for the difference between absolute and relative shifts (cf. Figure 3).
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was lower for typical adjustments of outline shapes (blue bars) than for photographs of
natural (green) and painted fruits (green–blue); at the same time, variances for grey
adjustments were similar across conditions. This is in line with the ﬁndings from
Experiment 1a (Figure 4(a)). It shows that typical adjustments of outline shapes are more
reliable than those for photographs. This observation is reasonable because the adjustment of
a uniform colour on the outline shape might be simpler than the adjustments of a colour
distribution in the photographs. However, this makes our model predict higher memory
colour eﬀects for outline shapes, while in reality measured memory colour eﬀects are
lower. The failure of the model to predict the diﬀerences across conditions is not
surprising because the model only considers knowledge about typical colours, and visual
features are not part of the model.
With respect to the variation across stimuli, there was a signiﬁcant positive correlation
across the ﬁve fruits for photographs, r(3)¼ .95, p¼ .006, one-tailed. For the painted fruits,
the correlation coeﬃcient was positive but not signiﬁcant, r(3)¼ .34, p¼ .29. However, the
correlation coeﬃcient was negative for outline shapes, r(3)¼.59. Combining the data from
the three conditions (original and painted photographs and outline shapes) resulted in a
positive correlation, which, however, did not reach signiﬁcance, r(13)¼ .43, p¼ .054, one-
tailed. Using the relative memory colour eﬀects so as to compensate for the eﬀect of condition
yielded a signiﬁcant positive correlation, r(13)¼ .63, p¼ .006, as found for Experiment 1a
above.
However, t tests across individual observers did not yield signiﬁcant results in any
condition (all p> .12). There were also no signiﬁcant results when pooling data across
individuals and stimuli (all p> .1).
To summarize, the results for the aggregated data conﬁrm those found for the other
dataset above (Experiment 1a). However, the Bayesian model provides inconsistent results
for the individual data. This may be due to the fact that adjustments are subject to
measurement noise that is not due to sensory uncertainty. Measurement noise results, for
example, from errors in handling the input device to control and conﬁrm adjustments. This
kind of noise is not accounted for in this particular model. The variability of adjustments
resulting from response noise reduces the reliability of both the grey settings and the
measured memory colour eﬀects. Since this random noise should be equal across objects,
adding noise to the model reduces its predictive power across objects. Hence, aggregated data
might result in a more successful model because the random noise is averaged out.
In addition, the Bayesian model failed to predict the pooled data despite high statistical
power due to the large number of cases. The pooled data include variability across observers.
The failure to model that data might indicate that the Bayesian model fails to account for
diﬀerences across individual observers. Observers considerably diﬀer not only in their
uncertainty, but also in other sources of variation that are not accounted for by the model
and contribute to measurement noise. Measurement noise reduces the measured memory
colour eﬀects. In contrast, it does not have the same attenuating eﬀects on the predictions
by the Bayesian model, in particular because a noisier sensory signal would predict higher
memory colour eﬀects. In this way, individual variation may undermine the relationship
between predicted and measured eﬀects.
Study of Witzel et al. (2011)
Witzel et al. (2011) measured memory colour eﬀects with man-made objects that could have a
wide range of diﬀerent memory colours and showed the modulation of memory colour eﬀects
along the daylight axis.
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Method
A total of 25 German observers participated in the experiment of Witzel et al. (2011). This
experiment included 14 images of man-made objects that were shown to be highly colour-
diagnostic for German observers in a preliminary experiment. The images were a photo of a
mailbox (yellow memory colour), a photo of a glue stick (yellow), a cartoon character ‘Maus’
(orange), a chair (brown), a closet (brown), an outline shape of a heart (red), a coca-cola logo
(red), a photo of a ﬁre extinguisher (red), a cartoon character ‘Pink Panther’ (pink),
a chocolate bar ‘Milka’ in typical wrapping (purple), a photo of a Nivea tin (blue),
a cartoon character ‘smurf’ (blue), an icon of a traﬃc sign (blue) and a pingpong table
(green). There were also two control stimuli that did not have a chromatic memory colour.
These were a striped sock that does not have any memory colour and a golfball that has an
achromatic memory colour. Observers completed three adjustments for each stimulus. Before
doing those adjustments, the sock was shown in its original colour (red–orange) to enable
observers to make typical adjustments.
Results and Discussion
Figure 6 illustrates the results for the aggregated data from Witzel et al. (2011). For many
objects, the Bayesian model provided quite accurate predictions (Figure 6(a)), such as for the
chair, the closet, the mailbox (‘mail’), the glue stick (‘uhu’), the pink-pong table (‘pingpong’),
the traﬃc sign (‘sign’) and the Nivea tin (‘nivea’). Measured memory colours were highest for
yellow and blue colours along the daylight locus (cf. grey bars in Figure 6(a)). This general
observation was captured by the Bayesian model, in that it also predicted high memory
colour indices for blue and yellow objects. At the same time, the model correctly predicted
low memory colour eﬀects for the ﬁre extinguisher and the pingpong table whose colours do
not lie along the daylight locus.
However, for some other objects the model failed. In particular, the measurements for red
heart, coca-cola logo, the orange Maus and the colour-neutral sock did not yield any memory
colour eﬀects (Witzel & Hansen, 2015; Witzel et al., 2011). Nevertheless, the model
incorrectly predicted high memory colour eﬀects for these objects. For the smurf, it
Figure 6. Predictions for aggregated data of Witzel et al. (2011). Panels and format are as shown in Figure 2.
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predicted by far the highest memory colour eﬀect, while the measured eﬀect was only
moderate. As a consequence of these failures, there was no correlation between predicted
and measured memory colour eﬀects, r(14)¼ .18, p¼ .25, one-tailed; Figure 6(b).
It may be noted that the heart, the coca-cola logo (‘coke’) and the golf ball yielded
opposite eﬀects, that is, negative memory colour indices. By design, the model cannot
predict negative eﬀects. Furthermore, the prediction of a positive memory colour eﬀect for
the sock is based on typical measurements of short-term memorization of the sock’s colour.
Yet, memory colour eﬀects require life-long experience and cannot be produced with
knowledge acquired through short-term training (Witzel & Hansen, 2015). The model,
however, cannot make a diﬀerence between life-long experience and short-term training.
We recalculated the correlation when excluding heart, coke, sock and golf ball because the
model cannot be expected to predict the measured eﬀects for those objects. In this case, the
correlation was just signiﬁcant in a one-tailed test, r(10)¼ .55, p¼ .03. For explorative
purposes, we also calculated the correlation after excluding the smurf. This correlation
would have been signiﬁcant, r(9)¼ .82, p¼ .001.
Average correlation coeﬃcients for the individual data of the 25 participants were not
above zero (Mr¼0.04). There was not even a positive correlation when excluding data for
heart, coke, sock and smurf (Mr¼0.1). Moreover, the correlation across individual
observers and stimuli was not positive either, r(398)¼.04, even when excluding heart,
coke, sock and smurf (Mr¼0.18). According to these results, our simple Bayesian model
cannot predict memory colour eﬀects across objects.
In sum, the Bayesian model could not account for the memory colour eﬀects found by
Witzel et al. (2011). This was the case despite the apparent relationship between the size of
memory colour eﬀect and the uncertainty of grey settings along the daylight locus, which
should have led to a successful application of the Bayesian model. One reason for the failure
of our Bayesian model for this dataset is certainly that this particular model cannot predict
negative shifts, that is, shifts in the direction of the typical colour. Red objects resulted in
negative shifts that contradict memory colour eﬀects. It is not clear why red objects do not
produce reliable memory colour eﬀects (Witzel & Hansen, 2015; Witzel et al., 2011). In any
case, our results show that the Bayesian model in its current implementation cannot account
for this particularity of red objects (Figure 6(b)).
Another reason for the failure of our model for the data of Witzel et al. (2011) may be the
mixture of photographs (e.g., Milka, Nivea and mailbox) and uniformly coloured shapes
(e.g., heart, smurf, Maus and pink panther). The results for the data of Olkkonen et al. (2008)
showed that the Bayesian model could not account for diﬀerences between photographs and
outline shapes. Like for outline shapes, the model overestimated the magnitude of the
memory colour eﬀect for uniformly coloured shapes, such as the heart, the smurf and
the Maus, which are basically outline shapes, some of them with black contours. So,
perhaps the failure of this Bayesian model to predict memory colour eﬀects for these
objects has similar reasons as the failure to predict the diﬀerence in memory colour eﬀects
for photos and outline shapes.
Conclusion
This study investigated a simple Bayesian model of memory colour eﬀects that would link
memory colour eﬀects to more general eﬀects of cue integration (Witzel & Gegenfurtner, in
press). We reanalysed the data of three studies (Hansen et al., 2006; Olkkonen et al., 2008;
Witzel et al., 2011) to test whether our Bayesian model can accurately predict memory colour
eﬀects and in particular their variation across stimuli. Our results were mixed.
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On the one hand, the model predicted memory colour eﬀects for the photographs of
fruits in Hansen et al. (2006) and Olkkonen et al. (2008) very well for aggregated data.
When accounting for the diﬀerence between photographs and outline shapes, the model
also succeeded to predict, more generally, variations of memory colour eﬀects across fruit
stimuli.
On the other hand, the model failed to predict the null eﬀects for certain stimuli, such as
the coca cola logo, the outline-shape of a heart and the cartoon-image of a smurf. The model
could also not account for the diﬀerent magnitudes of memory colour eﬀects for original
photographs, photographs of white-painted fruits and outline shapes. Most importantly, by
deﬁnition, Bayesian models are meant to account for data at the individual level by modelling
uncertainty in each individual observer. However, while our Bayesian model shows some
success in predicting aggregated memory colour eﬀects by modelling uncertainty across
observers, it failed to predict memory colour eﬀects for individual observers.
One important reason for the failures of our model is likely to be its restriction to
uncertainty about perceived grey and memorized colours. Other sources of variability,
such as limited discriminability or response noise due to diﬃculties with the adjustment
technique, are not integrated into this model. Integrating these sources of variability would
require not only an extension of the Bayesian model but also additional measurements of
discriminability and response noise independent of memory colour eﬀects. Another challenge
for a complete model of memory colour eﬀects is the integration of noncolour-related factors,
such as recognizability.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the great advantage of our Bayesian model is its
simplicity. It is completely determined by empirical data and does not have any free
parameters. Despite its simplicity, this model succeeded in predicting the magnitude of
memory colour eﬀects for photographs in the aggregate, and also captured some of the
variation of eﬀects across stimuli. In addition, the source of the variation in memory
colour eﬀects across the three image types (i.e., diﬀerent kinds of photos and outline
shapes) is most probably their recognizability rather than the uncertainty about colour
knowledge. It is in line with the logic of the design of our Bayesian model that it only
accounts for variation in colour knowledge but not for variation of recognizability.
Taken together, our Bayesian model provides a particularly simple, yet only partial
account of memory colour eﬀects. It captures some of the multiple sources of variation of
these eﬀects and misses others. These ﬁndings provide a starting point for developing more
elaborate models that include other sources of variation to fully account for diﬀerences of
memory colour eﬀects across stimuli and observers. In particular, our simple Bayesian model
may be used as a benchmark to assess new alternative models.
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